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Abstract: In China, state-owned commercial banks have monopoly
position on the banking loan market. This paper constructs a two-stage
dynamic game model to analyze the conspiracy in decision-making of bank
loans, based on the establishment of relationship lend between SMEs and
managers in large banks. Results indicate the existence of an optimal
equilibrium as the solution of conspiracy. A revised mathematical model
analysis with relaxed assumption shows that: if the state-owned banks
have the mastery of large amounts of capital, supervision of SMEs lending
are weak, and bank manager has the control of complete information of
enterprises, the conspiracy tendencies for both parties will be more obvious.
The conspiracy based on relationship lends between banks and enterprises
will greatly damage the interests of banks and extrude high-quality SMEs.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the market economy with the existence of asymmetric information and agency
costs, adverse selection and moral hazard may occur in the credit markets [1].
They advocate the implementation of credit rating for SMEs loans. Large financial
intermediaries can fully utilize the information to make lending decisions in order to
reduce ex ante cost and actual cost afterwards due to asymmetric information [2].
Berger [3] put forward the concept of relationship lend from point of view of the
information disclosure. That is, in the long-term relationship with SMEs, banks
continue to obtain “soft information” to improve the decision-making process of
loan. Boot [4] define the relationship banking activities as a financial services
offered by financial intermediaries, including (i) to invest in the information for
a special customer (mainly the information about property and assets); (ii) to
assess the profitability of these investments by long-term and wide range of contacts
with the same customer in different business areas. Relationship lend also refer
to long-term implicit contract between banks and borrowers in the provision of
investment loans or financial services, which banks can repeatedly utilize to deal
with the same customer [5,6].
Relationship lend also bears related cost. Relationship between bank and enter-
prises affected the ability of raising capital from domestic banks and non-banking
institutions. When banks filter borrowers for loans, they will obtain great deal of
information about borrowers, which improve the banks’ ability to closely monitor
the companies’ corporate management, and even affected the management decisions.
Thus the banks become the “inside debt holders”. Further studies suggest that
the close relationship between banks and enterprises created severe asymmetric
information between relationship banks and “outside bank”, which leads to the
information hold-up of relationship bank. Fully-informed banks have priorities in
negotiations, which will make it easy for them to extract monopoly rents from the
borrowers. The information monopoly of bank will lead to distortions in investment
incentives, the decline in efforts of borrower in investment management, as well as
the tendency of breach of contract for the managers.
The characters in banking industry structure have different effects on
relationship lend. Start-up SMEs would require more cheap credit in highly
concentrated market, compared to the less concentrated (competitive) market, while
banks are more willing to smooth lending rates throughout the life cycle of the
enterprise. Bank’s monopoly is in favor of the existence of relationship lend, while
competition and relationship lend are incompatible. Angelini, Di Salvo and Ferri [7]
found that market concentration do not have any impact on either interest rates or
the availability of loans. Berger and Udell [8] also stressed the importance of soft
information collected by loan officers and utilization of this information by banks.
Conventional loans are mainly based on the observable information of enterprise,
referred as “hard information” (including the financial statements of loans, small
business credit scoring, asset-based loans, mortgages, leases, etc.) [9]. Based on
the above literature findings, relationship lend provides new lending technologies
for banks, which are applied to borrowers with opaque information, they are
unsecured, privately-owned and lack of credit history, so the loan process has some
characteristics, such as strict regulations, repeated negotiations, long-term invisible
contracts and long-term soft information-gathering, etc. However, because most of
the decision variables involved in relationship lend are the private information that
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bank manager obtained in the process of dealing with customers, these variables
cannot be quantified. While the principal-agent relationship exists between banks
and credit manager, there is the possibility of conspiracy between the credit manager
and enterprise.
At present, research on relationship lend is focused on benefits and costs analysis,
bank’s concentration, the number of banks and impact analysis of relationship lend
between bank and enterprise. Based on the complete information of investment
projects hold by the banks, the paper tries to establish a dynamic game model.
The analysis finds the maximization condition of the income function of the
bank manager and enterprises with the two equilibrium solutions concerning
conspiracy between the two parties. Furthermore, assumptions are relaxed with
the introduction of government regulation and penalty factor, time length of the
relationship, degree of effort, and penalties for conspiracy decision-making. Finally,
counter-measures and policy recommendations are provided.
2. MODELS AND DISCUSSION ON GENERAL
EQUILIBRIUM
According to previous studies, the dynamic game model is established on the
following underlying assumptions: (1) the relationship banks fully understand
the enterprise information and process of investment project. As the rational
expectation hypothesis states, the bank will force the liquidation of the enterprise
assets when the enterprise meets financial problems, and required maximum value
of the liquidation for repayment; (2) the market size of capital markets in the
economy to satisfy the state-owned banks is far more than that of the private
commercial banks, and government is the actual owner of the state-owned banks.
So government is regarded as the initial principal of the state-owned commercial
banks, while commercial banks, with some decision-making power controlled by
bank managers, are regarded as an agent; (3) in order to solve the problem of
financing, it is possible for small and medium-sized enterprises(shorted for SMEs
thereafter) to conspire with the bank manager; (4) in order to complete short-term
credit quota and when the situation of enterprises are worsen due to financial
problems, the bank manager may also conspire with the enterprise. They can
avoid responsibility for the loan default and there is the potential transfer of
benefits; (5) when enterprises apply for loans from banks, there are two strategies
for enterprises: conspiracy, non-conspiracy; (6) when bank managers review and
supervise the loans of enterprises, there are two strategies for banks: conspiracy,
non-conspiracy.
Consider the economic environment with a small and medium-sized enterprises
and a state-owned commercial bank. In period 0, enterprise will invest with fund
I, the liquidation value for the assets purchased in period 1 is L, and L ≤ I. In
period 2, the assets depreciate to zero. In the period 1, there are two possibilities
for the investment project: the probability of good condition is q; the probability of
bad condition is 1− q. In the period 2, the investment projects would earn return
of X with probability 100% in good condition. In the bad condition, invest projects
would earn return of X with probability of 1/2, and the probability of investment
failure is 1/2, and the assets depreciate to zero, with X ≥ I ≥ L.
In this game, Ct is the cost of the conspiracy for the enterprise, CB is post cost
that is not compensated for when banks attempt to conspire with enterprise. N is
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Table 1
Pay-off of the conspiracy
Bank manager
Non-conspiracy
(1− β)
conspiracy
(β)
E
n
t
e
r
p
r
is
e Non-conspiracy
(1− α)
q(X − 1)− (1− q)(I − L),
NX
q(X − 1)− (1− q)(I − L),
NX − CB
conspiracy
(α)
q(X − I − Ct)− (1− q)(I − L− Ct),
NX
q(X − I − Ct) + (1− q)
(
1
2 × (X − I − Ct)
)
,
NX + f(x)
an exogenous decision variable representing professional ability of bank manager,
N ∈ (0, 1), which has a direct impact on the bank manager’s payoff function.
f(x) is the function of gains from success conspiracy of the bank manager and
enterprise, including currency income and non-monetary gains (job promotion,
performance, reputation, long-term relationship with customers, etc.). In order
to simplify the analysis, the model assumes that f(x) is exogenously determined,
and this assumption will be modified in the later analysis. Enterprises selected to
conspire with the probability of α, and bank manager select conspiracy with the
probability of β.
Expected return function for enterprise is:
EpiE = (1− α)× (1− β)×
[
q × (X − I)− (1− q)× (I − L)]
+(1− α)× β×[q × (X − I)− (1− q)× (I − L)]
+α× (1− β)×[q × (X − I − Ct)− (1− q)× (I − L− Ct)]
+α× β×
[
q × (X − I − Ct) + (1− q)× 1
2
× (I − L− Ct)
] (1)
Expected return function for bank managers is:
EpiB = (1− α)×(1− β)×NX + (1− α)× β × (NX − CB)
+α×(1− β)×NX + α× β × [NX + f(x)] (2)
The first-order conditions of maximization are:
∂EpiE
∂α
= 2qCt + Ct − 1
2
βqX +
3
2
βqCt
+
1
2
βI − βL− 3
2
βCt + βqL− 1
2
βqI +
1
2
βX = 0
(3)
∂EpiB
∂β
= −CB + α× CB + α× f(x) = 0 (4)
The results are:
α∗ =
CB
CB + f(x)
(5)
β∗ =
4q + 2
q
Ct
× (X − 3Ct − 2l + I) + 2L− I −XCt + 3
(6)
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The behavioral dynamic game has the following significance of path dependence.
Compared with conventional lending practices which are based on hard information,
relationship lend requires more technical conditions. Through the establishment of
cooperative relations, the bank manager who takes charge of loan projects has the
complete mastery of information on the enterprises and related investment projects,
reducing reverse selection and moral hazard aroused by asymmetric information.
But due to the multi-level agency relationships, the bank manager will maximize
the bank’s own interests as the agent, and enterprise ensure loans on consecutive
bases under the condition that the project is operated not so smooth. Under both
conditions, the formation of the conspiracy is highly possible.
On the basis of model assumptions, this game has a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium (non-conspiracy, non-conspiracy), (conspiracy, conspiracy), and a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium (α∗, β∗). Under this situation, (conspiracy, conspiracy)
is the optimal equilibrium solution. In the case for an enterprise application of
loans for an investment project, the bank managers play an important role in
collecting and utilize the soft information. The optimal probability of conspiracy
for the bank manager is a function of the enterprise and project information
β∗(q,X,Ct, I, L). When project management circumstances of the enterprise
(q,X, I, L) is given; enterprises can use more resources (Ct) to seek for the
bank-enterprise conspiracy, which will increase the probability of conspiracy for the
bank manager. Furthermore, successful conspiracy will also increase the expected
return of the enterprise. In spontaneous transactions market, SMEs in poor business
condition tend to devote more resources to seek conspiracy, so banks may not obtain
real enterprise information, which lead to the capital market failure and increase
the risk of adverse selection. When uncompensated cost of bank manager in the
conspiracy for his/her short-term performance expectations is given, the reward
that bank manager obtained from conspiracy (monetary income, job promotion,
human relations, and other non-monetary gains) will reduce the probability of
enterprise’s conspiracy. The explanation can rely on by the point of view of
certain internal control. Due to the competition between bank managers, they
choose to hold the soft information of the customer. The greater return the bank
manager earned in the conspiracy, the stronger they have the future control of the
enterprise, which will reduce the probability of conspiracy for enterprise, They turn
to re-measure(conspiracy, self-construction) the strategies from the perspective of
long-term development.
3. REVISED MODEL WITH LONG-TERM RELATION-
SHIPS AND GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS
Under the background of solving the financing difficulties of SMEs, the government
encouraged state-owned commercial bank to provide loans to SMEs by reducing the
approval threshold and the collateral requirements for the loan. These policies solve
the problem of financing for SMEs in the short term, but increases potential risk
of bank-enterprise conspiracy. A widely adopted indicator to measure the strength
of lending is the duration of this relationship between two parties. The revised
model relaxes the assumption of a single investment project and no regulatory by
principal. It introduces the length of time of bank-enterprise relationship between
(T ), that is from date of the first loan transaction of two parties as measure of
intensity of bank-enterprise relationship lend. What makes it reasonable is that it
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reflects accumulation of the personal information from the borrower, which has long
been held by the lenders. The model is corrected by the gains factor through the
establishment of long-term relationship (r), the income factor of the bank-enterprise
conspiracy (n) and penalty factor of the regulatory (p).
The tendencies of conspiracy for enterprises and banks are α, β, respectively.
Suppose that revenue functions of enterprise, bank manager, and government are:
uE = f1(r, t, α) + f2(n, α, β)− f3(α)
= r(t2 + α× t) + 1
2
(n× α× β)− p× α2
(7)
uB = f1(r, t, β) + f2(n, α, β)− f3(β)
= r(t2 + β × t) + 1
2
(n× α× β)− p× β2 (8)
uG = ω × t+ r × t
p
− (n× β × α)
2
p2
(9)
The first order conditions are:
∂uE
∂α
= t× r + 1
2
n× β − 2p× α = 0 (10)
∂uB
∂α
= t× r + 1
2
n× α− 2p× β = 0 (11)
∂uG
∂p
=
−r × t
p2
+
(n× α× β)2
p3
= 0 (12)
The results are:
α =
2t× r + n× β
2p
, β =
2t× r + n× α
2p
(13)
α∗ = β∗ =
2r × t
4p− n, p
∗ =
(n× α× β)2
r × t (14)
Compared with the previous model of single investment project without
government regulation, the revised model introduces relationship strength and
penalty factor of government supervision. Conspiracy tendency of enterprises and
banks is an increasing function of each other, and increase of conspiracy tendency
in either party will cause the other’s conspiracy tendency to increase. So in the
long-term relationship, higher conspiracy tendencies of the SMEs will contribute
directly to imperfect agent behavior of the bank manager. On the other hand,
for the purposes of benefits transfer, performance evaluation and promotion, bank
manager of state-owned commercial banks will take the advantage of long-term
relationships established with the enterprise to send the signal of conspiracy, thus
it will increase the conspiracy tendency of enterprise. Bank managers will utilize
more resources for the bank-enterprise relationship instead of the improvement of
their own ability. The stronger relationship intensity is, the higher the benefits
from long-term relationship are, and thus the stronger the conspiracy tendency of
the bank manager and enterprises is. And the stronger the relationship intensity is,
the higher the opportunity costs and payoff efforts are. If r, t, n are given, tighter
government regulation and punishment will reduce conspiracy tendency of the bank
manager and enterprises. As a principal in this dynamic game, government takes
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the optimal regulatory policy with punishment, which is positively correlated with
conspiracy gains and conspiracy tendency of the bank manager and enterprises.
While it is inversely proportional to the length of bank-enterprise relationship and
the reward of relationship loan, conspiracy tendency is expressed as the product of
conspiracy strategy of both parties. Compared to regulatory punishment caused
by the increase in conspiracy tendency, revenue decline will be relatively greater
considering the length of relationship, and clients put more emphasis on the losses
caused by the bank-enterprise conspiracy.
4. CONCLUSION
State-owned commercial banks occupy the fund that enterprises are in great need
of and these banks are lack of effective supervision. As an agent of the bank,
bank manager take initiative to maximize their own income. SMEs usually do
not have a solid financial system, adequate loan collateral, and they obtain loans
by establishing long-term relationship with the bank with soft information that
cannot be quantified. Bank managers take full advantage of information of SMEs
to cease the lending and to take investment projects to liquidation in case of
deterioration of the project proceeds. Then, bank managers and enterprises have the
possibility of conspiracy to maximize their own income. Each party will increase the
resources for conspiracy, and this will again increase conspiracy tendency. A vicious
circle may form: when enterprise have project with more risk, more uncertainty of
return on investment will appear. When adverse operating conditions exist, they
are inclined to conspire with bank managers with limited resources, rather than
investing in production and construction. SMEs with the poor condition tend to
obtain more loans, keeping many qualified enterprises out of the fund market, and
bank managers gain monetary and non-monetary rewards by conspiracy, ultimately
harm the interests of the state-owned commercial banks. The longer the relationship
between enterprises and bank managers, the more two parties are likely to conspire.
The relationship lend mechanism requires guardian against long-term relationships
caused by risk of imperfect agent. As the principal, government should have effective
stringent regulatory and punitive measures to reduce conspiracy tendency.
At present, financing difficulties of SMEs and the monopoly mode of capital
by state-owned commercial banks coexist, and the market to take full account
of the long-term effects on development of relationship lend for SMEs and take
measures to avoid and control risk. The principal (the government and regulatory
bodies) should increase the regulatory penalties on the banks for the conspiracy
to reduce the expected return of the bank manager. Government should help to
establish an effective evaluation system by review from different agents on the
same enterprise, ensuring the authenticity and validity of information. Besides
some internal controls, banks can establish regional inter-bank business credit
system, to reduce the asymmetric information on enterprise defaults, which make
the potential bank-enterprise conspirators recognized the systemic risk. Banks
should also establish an effective incentive mechanism to encourage enterprises
to focus on elevation on their own capacity and long-term development, rather
than short-term interests by conspiracy with banks. Detailed evaluation index
system for soft information of SMEs should be constructed. Further research can
make depth analysis of long-term relationship of the bank manager preferences,
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and impact of bank-enterprise conspiracy on the depth and breadth of entire
financing environment.
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